ASSESSMENT OF GABON’S INFLUENCE IN THE CEMAC REGION: PRESIDENT ALI BONGO’S TENURE AS CASE STUDY

Author: SARON MESSEMBE OBIA

Abstract

The 2023 coup d’état in Gabon expose the security dynamics of the country. However, president Ali Bongo’s leadership and quest for influence in the region is worth studying. This paper examines the insignificant role of Gabon in the Gulf of Guinea. But also, highlights her importance in the Central African Early Warning System (MARAC), which is moderating security dynamics in the region, economic influence and regional integration. Yet, the paper equally reveals several challenges which can be overcome through joint initiation and collaboration with other states of the region

Key words: Leadership, security, economic integration

Introduction

Gabon is one of the countries of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, which is usually compared to an equatorial emirate, and with low population density. Located on the Atlantic coast, the Gabonese Republic is bordered by the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea. The country is relatively small, with an area of 270,000 km2 and an estimated population of 2.1 million. It historically has maintained strong ties with France, making Gabon arguably the most vital partner in the sub-region for France-Afrique relation. In terms of nominal GDP, it is slightly below Cameroon and comfortably positions itself as 2nd in the sub-region. Gabon’s influence is based on its: relative stability of its political institutions, the country’s membership of the CEMAC zone where the regional monetary policies offer long-term monetary stability; and its strong natural resources endowment, the development of which offers numerous opportunities under the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)[1] market and emerging countries demand for commodities.

In Africa, Gabon stands out for both its high income and its rich natural resources. It is amongst Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries with upper-middle-income status; its prosperity is due to its diverse endowment of natural resources. Gabon has the second largest economy in the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC). Topping its wealth of nonrenewable resources are petroleum, manganese, and to a lesser extent uranium, iron ore, diamonds, and gold. Rainforest of Gabon appeals to its rich ecosystem and extensive endowments of fertile land, water courses, and fisheries.

However, in terms of development, the country continues to emerge in different sector and obtaining opportunities regionally and internationally. The country is endowed with resources (oil and gas), which offers an opportunity for natural gas exploitation, petrochemical complex programmed in the Port-Gentil region, and also the development of mineral resources, through the Bélinga sector iron deposits. Gabon’s forest sector, is increasingly gaining market. At the first half of 2010, the Government raised the wood processing target to 100%, compared to the original target of 75% in 2012. The processing of wood locally creates opportunities for redistribution of the value-added in favor of the host country, particularly through employment and redistribution of the profit margin. Gabon is among the few countries in SSA that have demonstrated commitment to protect biodiversity, curb carbon emissions, and address challenges related to climate change.

Regional bloc in Africa

Gabon is amongst the other five countries which constitute the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), one of the oldest regional groupings in Africa. A well-structured organization (CEMAC) with vision making the sub-region “an emerging and integrated economic space characterized by security, solidarity and good governance in the service of human development”[2]. Gabon like the other five countries which constitute the bloc, prone for effective customs union, macroeconomic surveillance, and the harmonization of sectoral policies and legal frameworks (OHADA law) that will create a common market for goods, capital, and services[3].

Despite this ambitious vision, regional integration in the CEMAC zone is challenging. The common external tariff is not endorsed by all member states; some member countries put national interest first and breach solidarity. Numerous obstacles to the free trade and movement of people; and sectoral and economic policies are far from being harmonized. This appeal to the 2-5% total trade in CEMAC zone, considered the lowest of any regional integration community.

In 2014-15, oil price dropped, an affected the six CEMAC economies and promoted recommitment to deepening regional integration. In a crisis meeting in Yaoundé on December 23, 2016, CEMAC’s heads of state committed to fiscal austerity and structural reforms[4]. The six members subscribed to regionally-coordinated effort to maintain CEMAC’s external stability and preserve the integrity of its monetary arrangement, which led to the creation of the regional economic and financial reform program (PREF-CEMAC), launched in July 2016.

The major agenda of PREF at the regional level: improve the coordination of public financial management (PFM) and fiscal policy; accelerate regional integration; improve the business climate; increase economic diversification; enhance monetary policy transmission mechanisms; and improve prudential banking supervision. Regional entities, such as BEAC and COBAC, have improved in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, and promotion of financial sector stability. However, there is need to retain a commitment to fiscal consolidation and ensure that the regional macro surveillance is enforced by member countries.

This paper will further explore Gabon’s influence in the CEMAC zone, and its potential, which expects her to play an important role in strengthening regional integration. This potential should also be used to benefit from a market of over 120 million people within ECCAS. However, sub regional integration remains a phenomenal challenge.

Gabon’s Security influence

With regards to security issues in the Gulf of Guinea, engagement in the menace of Boko Haram, Gabon is of less influence. She’s not part of the countries which constitute the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC).  In Central Africa, Gabon is part of The Central African Early Warning System (MARAC) which is moderating security dynamics in the region. Since 2007, the organ has been empowered by the European Union (EU), and the EU-ECCAS Support Programme for Peace and Security in Central Africa (PAPS) assisting the community regional peace and security dynamics.

The lessons from years internal wranglings in Africa, make it clear that regional economic cooperation could not succeed without regional peace and security. As a result, ECCAS’s mandate was broadened to include the joint promotion of peace, security and stability in the sub-region. As a result of the new focus on security, several additional organs and mechanisms have been created. These include the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX), created in February 1999 to promote, maintain and consolidate peace and security in the area covered by ECCAS[5].

The COPAX protocol was adopted in 2000 and its standing orders in June 2002. Article 4 of its protocol mainly defines COPAX’s objectives in the field of preventing, managing and settling conflicts; reducing tensions and preventing armed conflicts; developing confidence-building measures between member states; promoting peaceful dispute-resolution measures; and facilitating mediation efforts in crises and conflicts between member states and with third parties (ECCAS 2010).

COPAX has three key technical organs. The Commission for Defense and Security (CDS) brings together member states’ chiefs of staff and commanders in-chief of police and gendarmerie forces. It advises the conference of heads of state on security and defense issues as well as on the organization of any joint military operations. The Central African Early Warning System (MARAC) collects and analyses data for the early detection and prevention of conflicts and crises. The Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) is a non-permanent peace-support operation comprising contingents from member states for regional peacekeeping and peace-support.

Gabon is a major actor in the quest for sustainable stability and peace in the region, in order to facilitate MARAC’s operations and implementation of operational guidelines elaborated by the ECCAS secretariat, Gabon received other states in September 2007 in Libreville (Gabon) to discuss issues about the region. It’s worth noting that, since May 2008, MARAC has carried out regular early warning and conflict analyses, and data collection is organised by an observation Centre in Libreville, Gabon (ECCAS, 2010).

The European Commission (EC) assisted MICOPAX, (which took over from FOMUC in July 2008), financially to coordinate activities in the region, with € 14.6 million for troop allowances and general maintenance. France assisted with € 9.5 million in 2009, for the new mission which had more personnel. In 2010, 527 troops were contributed primarily by Cameroon, Gabon, Chad and the DRC. In contrast to FOMUC, MICOPAX’s mandate also foresees inclusion of a police and a civil element. Whereas 146 policemen and 21 military police have already joined the operation, the civil component is still being assembled and has not been fully deployed. One could arguably conclude that, Gabon has limited influence in terms of security in the CEMAC zone, though active player in ECCAS different departments, she is more of economically focus.

Gabon’s Economic influence

Gabon is currently a significant actor in the production of oil and gas, and one of the most consequential in Francophone Africa. Gabon is currently the eighth largest producer of oil in sub-Saharan Africa with a production of 198,000 barrels per day.  Petroleum is the primary source of public revenue in Gabon[6].  She rejoined OPEC in the summer of 2016.  The World Bank estimated that, on average over the period of 2010-2015, Gabon’s oil sector accounted for 80 percent of exports, 45 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and 60 percent of government revenue. 

However, in 2017, oil revenues accounted for 27% of GDP and approximately 35% of government revenues[7].  With Gabon’s overwhelming economic reliance on oil exports, the country’s near-term economic outlook depends on oil production and prices. Production in 2017 was estimated at 10.5 millions of tones (Gabonese authorities estimation).  New offshore prospects have been identified.

In March 2018, Gabon organized a sectorial meeting with oil experts in Libreville on revisions to the 2014 oil code, to make it more attractive and adapt to current realities[8].  Under the current code, Gabon takes a minimum 20% stake in oil projects, while country-owned Gabon Oil Co. (GOC) is entitled to a further 15% stake.  Like other oil-dominated economies of the CEMAC’s single-currency zone, Gabon has struggled due to the decline in crude prices, forcing it to seek support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2017.  The country appeals for flexibility when the code will be updated, which will help boost company income and value-added taxes.  However, interest in offshore oil permits remains high. 

Malaysian state-owned company Petronas announced in March 2018 that their ultra-deep-water exploration well, drilled in water depths of 2,800 meters, encountered 90 meters of gross high-quality hydrocarbon-bearing pre-salt sands[9].  The discovery has piqued the interests of the industry and may augur renewed interest in Gabon as prices rise again.

Regional integration in the CEMAC zone

Regional integration is the process where countries in a defined geographical zone voluntarily surrender their sovereignty in one or more areas to carry out specific transactions, in view of achieving a goal(s) or enjoying specific benefits to a higher degree than they would individually. When it concerns cooperation in the domain of trade, it is called regional economic integration. Gabon is more focus on economic integration, though certain challenges have been remarked. Generally, economic integration is to boost community trade, thereby removing trade barriers between member states, to prone emergence.

Economic Integration

Economic integration is not a new phenomenon in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) zone. Some scholars like Gankou and Ntah, trace the origins of integration to the Afrique Equatoriale Francaise (AEF), during French colonial experience. N’Kodia argues that the experience of integration in Central Africa is ‘the result of the progressive assertion of a Pan-African conscience and the quest for independence born out of colonization’.

Whichever position one takes, it is clear that there is a strong historical basis for integration among CEMAC states. It is thus understandable that the first formal economic integration scheme among independent states of Central Africa, the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), was created only four years after independence. The treaty establishing UDEAC was signed on the 8 December 1964 in Congo Brazzaville and entered into force on the 1 January 1966.The main objectives of UDEAC were to liberalize trade among members and adopt a common external tariff for non-members. It also aimed at harmonizing investment and industrial policies. As a sub-regional project, it was the oldest in Central Africa and one of the most ambitious. UDEAC however failed to meet its objectives and was replaced in 1994 by CEMAC.

The treaty instituting CEMAC was signed on the 16 March 1994 by Cameroon, Gabon, Congo Brazzville, Chad, the CAR and Equatorial Guinea. This treaty entered into force in December 1999. The main objectives of the CEMAC are to strengthen relations between member states and promote a spirit of solidarity within the sub-region, and to promote national markets through the elimination obstacles to trade, the coordination of development programs, the harmonization of industrial projects and the creation of a common market.

Leadership is a strategic aspect for regional integration in the CEMAC zone, the potential of Gabon- Cameroon and the obstacles in the sub-region. Lessons from other parts of the world has shown that leadership plays a vital role in the development of a regional integration scheme. In West Africa, Nigeria is the pillar for the development of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), while Senegal and Ivory Coast have constituted the centre of stimulus for the more restricted West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). But this is not the case in the CEMAC zone. Here, no state or couple of states has assumed a leadership role.

It’s evident that Cameroon and Gabon can jointly exercise leadership, because historical and natural endowment, couple the potential for stewardship in the sub-region that cannot be associated with any other pair. However, they are yet to do so, partly as a result of obstacles originating with the two states and other member states of CEMAC as well as some extra-regional players, particularly France.

Gabon is one of the member nations of CEMAC, which was created to integrate regional economies and boost trade. While the bloc has successfully established the free movement of capital, a shared currency and a wide range of common regional institutions, a number of the other aspects of the proposed integration have been restrain. This has slowed economic growth and trade, and helped sustain a dependence on oil revenues for some of the member states.

The bloc also shares a central bank, the Bank of Central African States (Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale, BEAC), founded in 1973, as well as a stock market, the Central African Stock Exchange (Bourse des Valeurs Mobilières de l’Afrique Centrale, BVMAC), although Cameroon also operates a rival market of its own, the Douala Stock Exchange.

ECCAS was founded as one of the pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC), in the context of the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action. Its original agenda was to prepare at the regional level for the continental economic integration of Africa and the establishment of an African Common Market by 2000. Consequently, it was directed at facilitating self-sustaining development in Central Africa “in order to achieve collective self-reliance, increase and maintain economic stability, foster close and peaceful relations between Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent.” During its creation in 1983, the major aspects were; the establishment of a single regional market, uplifting of tariff and nontariff barriers; establishing a common external customs tariff and common trade policy towards third countries; progressive achievement of the free movement of persons, goods, services and as well as harmonization of national policies in a number of fields, such as industry, transport, energy and agriculture.

Challenges of Gabon’s influence in the CEMAC zone

Economic and leadership challenge

The negative rhetoric and increasingly distrustful attitude of Equatorial Guinea towards Cameroon, its intervention in the delicate relationship between Cameroon and Nigeria, her constant suspicion that Cameroon involvement in a conspiracy to destabilize her, have given the impression that Equatorial Guinea wants to increase its influence in the sub-region by adopting an anti-Cameroon perspective.

This attitude by Equatorial Guinea can be seen as a manifestation of the country’s leadership ambition and also as a fear of Cameroon’s dominance. Cameroonian citizens have been treated with a lot of contempt in recent decades and travel restrictions on Cameroonians are rife. Gabon like Equatorial Guinea has exhibited an anti-leadership attitude in its relations with Cameroon. This is very visible from the nature of relations between the leaders of the two countries.

Even with the accession of President Ali Bongo to power, there is very limited communication with the president of the Republic of Cameroon. Also the Cameroonian President has not visited Gabon since President Ali Bongo’s accession to power in 2010. Similarly, President Omar Bongo declared in an interview: “I have been to Yaoundé on several occasions; Paul Biya never pays me a visit. I will not visit him again.”[10]

As already mentioned above, there has been competition for leadership between Gabon and Cameroon since 1968. While it is common for leading states to have different views on important issues, such differences become problematic when they paralyse cooperation. Gabon and Cameroon’s quarrels are evidenced by the difficulty in reaching agreement on important decisions such as the creation of a sub-regional airlines company (Air CEMAC) and a sub-regional stock exchange. The disagreement between Cameroon and Gabon over the location of a sub-regional stock exchange, leading to the establishment of one in Douala and another in Libreville, is a clear testimony of the persistence of such quarrels that limits the integration process within the CEMAC.

The Douala Stock Exchange (DES) was created on the 1st of December 2001 following a decision by President Biya of Cameroon. The DES was inaugurated on the 23 April 2005. With a capital of 1.2 billion Francs CFA, this stock exchange had its first quotation by the end of May 2006. On the other hand, the stock exchange in Libreville, in Gabon, named the Central African Stock Exchange for Transferable Shares (Bourse des Valeurs Mobilières de l’Afrique Centrale (BVMAC)), was created on 27 June 2003 and started activities in February 2006.

Security approach in the region

Gabon and neighbors in west and central Africa, all face new challenges and threats to peace and stability, for the years to come. In this perspective, what are Gabon’s options with its regional partners? First, the most pressing regional challenge is fighting Boko Haram in the LCBC, which Gabon is not involved. These organizations are increasingly relying on financing their activities with illegal trading in products like ivory, rhino horns, and bush meat not to mention illicit drugs. Ensuring regional stability will further require the following actions by Gabon and its neighbors[11]:

– Jointly tackling the illegal circulation of light and small weapons;

– Fighting cross-border crimes, and illegal exploitation of national resources;

– Combating piracy on the Gulf of Guinea.

Gabon is taking the opportunity of its chairmanship of ECCAS to promote new regional strategies and to strengthen those already in place. Regional integration policies could have destabilizing organized crimes and terrorists activities, particularly in the area of free circulation of persons and goods. It is important for countries in the region to effectively cooperate in managing the free circulation of persons in a region facing various security threats.

The Existence of Protectionist Intentions and Practices

Regional integration by design leads to the erosion of state sovereignty. Yet it is not uncommon for countries to recourse to protectionist measures to protect their sovereignty within integration schemes to maintain some level of control over their economies[12]. The situation is worse when such practices are carried out by core states and affect cooperation between them.  Therefore, while such practices are not new in the politics of regional integration, the problem in CEMAC is that they affect cooperation between the core states like Gabon and Cameroon, in important sectors that are indispensable for integration like freedom of movement.

Cameroonians still need to obtain a visa to travel to Gabon. The procedural implications of this grossly hinder the movement of factors of production (people, goods, services and capital). Under these circumstances the generation of wealth is highly compromised. The need for visas is also an obstacle to dialogue, as it affects the rate of travel by members of government from Cameroon to Gabon. While it is the sovereign right of every state to make obtaining a visa an imperative for visits by aliens this situation is an obstacle within the context of integration. It is thus not surprising that Nkendah has attributed the high volume of informal trade between Cameroon and Gabon to visa restrictions.

Conclusion

Gabon’s resource endowment makes the country a giant in the region, yet cooperative leadership between Gabon and Cameroon in CEMAC is clearly indispensable for successful economic integration. There have been sustained efforts to maintain frequent meetings between cabinet members within the framework of the Cameroon-Gabon Joint Commission since 1968. A protein alliance between Gabon –Cameroon, which have natural ports facilities and the richest reserves of natural resources in the sub-region, will reconfigure new integration process. Cameroon and Gabon also represent 56 % of the GDP.

Finally, of all CEMAC member states, only Cameroon and Gabon have been politically stable since independence. However, as demonstrated above, despite their historical legitimacy, their cumulated economic and demographic weight, the abundance of raw materials in the two countries and especially their strategic position, the couple faces several obstacles that prevent them from exercising the influence necessary to boost integration in the area. The existence of protectionist intentions and practices, quarrels for sub-regional leadership between the two countries, the low frequency of meetings between cabinet members in spite of the diplomatic efforts made since 1961 and the absence of strategic joint economic projects, are important obstacles to the leadership potential of the duo. As the analysis shows, to overcome these obstacles and effectively play the role of locomotive for integration in the sub-region, the two countries must be able to take a common position on CEMAC projects.

About the authors

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Email:sirmessembe@gmail.com

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[1] ECCAS was created in 1983. Its 10 member states are Cameroon, Gabon, CAR, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Burundi, DRC, Angola and São Tomé and Principe.

[2] World Bank. 2018. CEMAC: Deepening Regional Integration to Advance Growth and Prosperity. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31942 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.

[3] Ibid2

[4] Ibid

[5] Meyer, A. (2011) Peace and security cooperation in central Africa Developments, challenges and Prospects NORDISKA AFRIKAINSTITUTET, UPPSALA 2011. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:442741/FULLTEXT01.pdf

[6] https://www.selectusa.gov/article?id=Gabon-Petroleum-and-Crude-Production

[7] Gabon Country Commercial Guide, https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=Gabon-Petroleum-and-Crude-Production

[8] SELECT USA’s report on Gabon’s Oil and Gas. https://www.selectusa.gov/article?id=Gabon-Petroleum-and-Crude-Production

[9] Malaysia’s Petronas announces deepwater oil, gas discovery offshore Gabon by Xinhua (2018). http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/05/c_137017632.htm

[10] Ngogang, T., ‘Bongo et Sassou lâchent Paul Biya’, quotidiens Mutation du 06/04/2004 p.3., translation by author.

[11] Read; HE Noël Nelson Messone (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Gabon) presentation in 2017 on Gabon’s Foreign Policy: What Role in Regional Peace and Development? Chatham House.

[12] https://cesran.org/leadership-and-economic-integration-the-case-of-the-cameroon-gabon-couple.html